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RECENT CASES

should not be prohibited unless it is contrary to good morals or
against public policy. There is difficulty in discerning the difference
between advertising the business of the occupier or the business of
another; it may be a distinction without a difference. It is not the
letter, word or model that endangers the public; it is the structure
upon which it is attached that may be dangerous.2 5 The ordinance
in the instant case permits one type of advertising and forbids
another; it does not promote the public health, safety, morals and
2
welfare and it does not remedy an existing evil,' "
JOHN M. ORBAN.

PROCESS -

SERVICE UPON NONRESIDENT MOTORIST -

INTERPRETA-

A filling station attendant brought
an action against a nonresident motorist to recover for scalds and
burns suffered while servicing the motorist's automobile at a gasoline service station. The Circuit Court of Arkansas entered an
order sustaining motion to quash service and the attendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held, that the nonresident
motorist was not amenable to substituted service of process in the
state under the Nonresident Motorist Statute' since the alleged
cause of action arose out of an accident which occurred upon private property and not upon the public highway as the statute expressly requires. 2 Langley v. Bunn, 284 S.W.2d 319 (Ark. 1955).
The constitutionality of states' regulation of nonresident motorists
as a police power has long been decided and is not an issue in this
case.' The issue is the interpretation of the wording of the statutes
by the courts. Nonresident' service statutes have been interpreted
both strictly4 and liberally. 5 However the majority of courts have
TION OF APPLICABLE STATUTE.

-

25. People ex rel. Wineburgh Advertising Co. v. Murphy, 195 N. Y. 126, 88 N.E.
17 (1909).
26. People v. Wolf, 127 Misc. 382, N.Y.S. (Nassau County Ct. 1926) (ordinance that prohibited signboards on vacant lots except to advertise the sale of such lot held

invalid.).
1. Ark.

Stat. Ann.,

§ 27-342.1

(1955)

"The

acceptance

by

a

nonresident

owner of the rights and privileges to drive or operate a motor vehicle upon the public
highway of this State shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment of the Secretary of
the State of Arkansas to be the true and lawful attorney and agent of such nonresident
upon whom may be served all lawful process in any action growing out of accident or
collision in which said nonresident may be involved while operating a motor vehicle on
such highway."

2. Ark.

Stat.

Ann.,

§ 27-341.1

(1953)

"Any

public

highway

within

the

borders of the State of Arkansas including byways, county highways, State highways, roads
or highways in national parks and roads or highways in military reservations whether used
conditionally or unconditionally by the public."

3.
(1936);
4.
5.
(1941).

Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13; Kelso v. Bush, 191 Ark. 1044, 89 S.W.2d 594
Pawloski v. Hess, 253 Mass. 478, 144 N.E. 760 (1924).
Kelley v. Koetting, 164 Kan. 542, 190 P.2d 361 (1948).
Gallagher v. Dist. Court of 6th Judicial Diet., 112 Mont. 253, 114 P.2d 1047
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taken the former approach feeling bound by the principle that the
statutes are in derogation of the common law and are to be strictly
construed. 6 With this view in mind it has been held that the
statutes could not constitutionally apply to accidents which did not
arise from the use of the highway7 Thus accidents which have
occurred upon a private driveway," on the grounds of a filling
station, in a privately owned garage,"° in a grain field adjoining a
road," or on the parking lot of a night club, 12 have all been held
.to bar the resident from obtaining service of process on the nonresident motorist. Jurisdictions favoring liberal construction theorize that strict construction of such narrow provisions as found in
these statutes defeats the intent of the legislature, 13 and that ordinary stops incident to the operation of a motor vehicle upon the
highway should not bar application of the Nonresident Motorist
Statute.'" Several states having such statutes have allowed recovery
when the accident did not occur upon the highway of the state."
Although in the instant case the Arkansas court has adhered to
its adoption of strict construction of the Nonresident Motorists
Statute, 6 there is a growing tendency for courts to hold the opposite. 17 North Dakota has amended its applicable statute so that it
now provides for service upon the nonresident whether the accident
occurs on a public highway or upon public or private property. 8
This more explicit statute obviates the necessity of reading into
the statute the intent of the enacting legislature and lessens the
possibility of a court conflict such as appears in the instant case.
Nonresident motorist statutes having provisions similar to the
6. Kelley v. Koetting, 164 Kan. 542, 190 P.2d 361 (1948); Brown v. Cleveland
Tractor Co., 265 Mich. 475, 251 N.W. 557 (1933).
7. Finn v. Schreiber, 35 F. Supp. 638 (W. D. N.Y. 1940); Brauer Machine and
Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co., 383 Ill. 569, 50 N.E.2d 836 (1943) ("It makes no
difference where the injury actually occurs if it may be attributed to the use of the iiighway
and naturally flows therefrom.").

8. Zulenski v. Lyford, 175 Misc. 202, 22 N. Y. S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
9. Finn v. Schreiber, 35 F. Supp. 638, (W. D. N. Y. 1940).
10. Haughey v. Minneola Garage, Inc., 174 Misc. 332, 20 N.Y. S.2d 857
Ct. 1940).

(Sup.

11. Kelley v. Koetting, 164 Kan. 542, 190 P.2d 361 (1948).
12. Harris v. Hanson, 75 F. Supp. 481 (S. D. Idaho 1948).

13. Gallagher v. Dist. Court of 6th Judicial Dist., 112 Mont. 253, 114 P.2d 1047
(1941);

Sipe v. Moyers, 353 Pa. 75, 44 A.2d 263, 264 (1945)

(dictum).

14. McDonald v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.2d 621, 275 P.2d 464 (1954)

(Normal

operation of a vehicle includes more than its movements over the highway).

15. See, e.g., Paduchik v. Mikoff, 158 Ohio St. 533, 110 N.E.2d 562 (1953)
cident occurring in farmyard);

Sipe v. Moyers, 353 Pa. 75, 44 A.2d 263 (1945)

(Ac(Acci-

dent occurring upon business premises); Bertrand v. Wilds, 281 S.W.2d 390 (Tenn. 1955)
(Accident occurring upon the driveway of veterans hospital).

16. Kerr v. Greenstein, 213 Ark. 447, 212 S.W.2d 1 (1948).
17. See Schefke v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 289 P.2d 542 (Cal. 1955);
Gallagher v. Dist. Court of 6th Judicial Dict., 112 Mont. 253, 114 P.2d 1047 (1941).
18. N.D. Rev. Code,
26-0611 (Supp. 1953); N.D. Sess. Laws 1951, c. 202 § 1.
Cf., N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0611 (1943).
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one in the instant case appear to have created an artificial and unreasonable distinction. This distinction has caused most states to
hold that the provisions of the statutes cannot constitutionally extend to accidents involving nonresidents, who after having entered
the state proceed onto private or other public property and there
cause injury to another.
This case illustrates the importance of careful drafting of the
Nonresident Motorist Statue. To restrict the inherent danger of a
motor vehicle solely to the highway as was done in this case denies
the resident proper protection and seems to defeat the intent of the
lawmakers.
RONALD SPLITT.

WORKMEN'S
PLOYMENT-

COMPENSATION

-INJURIES

ARISING "OUT

OF"

EM-

RIGHT OF TRAVELING EMPLOYEE TO COMPENSATION.

-

Decedent and a female companion died in a hotel fire caused by the
careless smoking of one or both of the parties. Decedent had been
traveling on the business of his employer. The petitioners, decedent's wife and minor daughter, filed a claim under the California
Workmen's Compensation Act which was denied by the state Industrial Accident Commission. The California Supreme Court, two
justices dissenting, held that the death arose out of and in the course
of employment and thus was compensable under the act. Wiseman
v. Industrial Accident Commission, 46 Cal.2d 570, 297 P.2d 649
(1956).
The courts generally agree that the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Acts should be given broad construction,' and
reasonable doubts resolved in favor of the employee. 2 Recovery is
limited to injuries arising out of and in the course of employment.' The former relates to a causal connection between the accident and the employment, and the latter refers to the "time, place,
4
and circumstances" of the accident.
1. E.g., Desautel v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 72 N.D.

38, 4 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1942)

35,

(dictum).

2. E.g., Truck Ins. Exchange v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n., 27 Cal.2d 813, 167 P.2d
705, 706 (1946) (dictum); Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 170 P.2d 404,

406 (1946) (dictum).
3. 6 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation § 1542 (3rd ed. 1948). Forty-one states
have statutes containing both phrases. N. Dak., Penn., Texas, and Wash. statutes contain only "in the course of". N. D. Rev. Code § 65-0102, 8 (Supp. 1953) "'Injury' shall
mean only an injury arising in the course of employment." N. Dak. law contains no other
equivalent of "'arising out of" the employment as regards accidental injuries and only the
single element must be found to award recovery. Lippman v. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, 79 N. D. 248, 55 N.W.2d 453 (1952).
4. E.g., Lippman v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 79 N.D. 248,

252, 55 N.W.2d 453, 458 (1952)

(dictum).

